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Introduction: the transformation of
competition policy in Europe1
Bruce Lyons
Competition arises when ﬁrms ﬁght for customers by offering them a better
deal in terms of price, quality, range, reliability or associated services. It is
messy. Some ﬁrms lose market share and others exit. Successful ﬁrms can
make substantial proﬁts. The reward for consumers is that it gives them
products they want and at a price that reﬂects the resource cost of providing
them. This book is about how competition policy is used to maintain
competition in European markets. Such policies are effective when they
stimulate competition but counterproductive if they stiﬂe it. This is a tricky
balance to achieve. It requires a subtle understanding of competition
economics.
The ﬁrst three sections of this chapter start from a satellite picture of the
economic system and progressively zoom in on the detail of individual
markets and business practices. Section 1 introduces themerits of competition
as the fundamental force driving the economy in the right direction. It also
notes the temptation for businesses to suppress competition, though this is
not always easy to do. How can we identify when business practices are likely
to be harmful? And how can we balance such dangers against heavy-handed
suppression of efﬁcient and innovative strategies? The branch of economics
that has developed this understanding is known as industrial organisation. It
focuses on individual market outcomes and provides the intellectual founda-
tion for what has become known as the economic (or effects-based) approach
to competition policy. Section 2 provides a glimpse of this research into the
implications of various business practices under alternative market structures.
Section 3 identiﬁes the channels through which a particular business practice
may or may not harm competition. This is a helpful step in formulating the
economic analysis in a way suitable for legal screening.
1 I thank Steve Davies for his typically insightful comments. Neither he nor the authors of the case studies
bear any responsibility for the views contained in this chapter.
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The economic approach to competition policy has not always been
favoured in Europe (or in North America). Different countries have had
different motivations for laws relating to competition. Some interventions
have been more anticompetitive than pro-competitive. In recent years,
however, there has been a fundamental shift towards the economic approach.
There has also been a unifying focus provided by the European Commission –
the world’s only supranational competition agency. Section 4 gives a ﬂavour of
these early differences and the evolving convergence.
Each of the seventeen case studies in this book illustrates both the economic
approach and how far it has (and sometimes has not) developed in Europe.
Section 5 completes this introductory chapter by explaining the organisation
of the book into three parts. It is left to separate introductions for each part to
outline each case study and sketch the relevant legal background.
1. The benefits of competition
It is a marvel of the market economy that the apparent chaos of competition
results in such signiﬁcant beneﬁts. The system works because market prices
summarise a vast amount of information on supply and demand conditions in
a way that is most relevant for commercial and private buyers. If these prices
are set competitively, the outcome has a strong claim to be the most efﬁcient
that can be achieved.
The essential economic beneﬁts were articulated with enduring clarity by
Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, ﬁrst published in 1776. Competition
not only keeps prices low and close to cost,2 it also reduces costs as ﬁrms ﬁght
for market share and survival.3 Individual producers may be driven by a
selﬁsh proﬁt motive and have no direct interest in the welfare of unrelated
2 ‘… the price of free competition… is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the
same time continue their business’. ‘The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can
be got’ (Book I, Chapter VII).
3 This applies both aggressively – ‘in order to undersell one another, have recourse to new divisions of
labour, and new improvements of the art, which might never otherwise have been thought of ’ – and
defensively – ‘Monopoly … is the great enemy of good management, which can never be universally
established but in consequence of the free and universal competition which forces every body to
have recourse to it [i.e. good management] for the sake of self-defence.’ As quoted in Vickers (1995).
Sir John Hicks (1935) summarised this in his famously pithy phrase: ‘The best of all monopoly proﬁts is a
quiet life.’
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customers, but as long as the process is competitive it is as if an ‘invisible hand’
guides the outcome so that it is indeed beneﬁcial for consumers.4,5
Modern economics has honed and formalised Adam Smith’s insight in a
number of ways that enable a deeper understanding of competition and its
beneﬁts. One approach, known as general equilibrium theory, derives a
sufﬁcient set of conditions such that apparently anarchic, decentralised deci-
sion making across many different markets results in a Pareto efﬁcient
economy, which is to say an outcome in which no one could be made better
off without making someone else worse off. Competitive pricing is the ﬁrst of
these essential conditions. In contrast, textbook monopoly pricing is Pareto
inefﬁcient because output is restricted, driving a wedge between consumer
valuation and marginal cost. Other conditions necessary for an efﬁcient
economy are the absence of uncompensated externalities and no distortions
due to asymmetric information. This particular formalisation of the efﬁciency
of a competitive economy is known as the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of
welfare economics.6 Other approaches highlight more dynamic aspects of
the competitive process and identify further beneﬁts for technical progress.7
Economic history provides much macroeconomic evidence on the eco-
nomic beneﬁts of a broadly competitive market economy. For example,
Douglass North (1991) contrasts how the early colonists of North America
took British institutions with them, and these enabled competitive markets to
develop based on secure property rights and decentralised decisionmaking. In
contrast colonisation of South America took place at a time of bureaucratic,
centralised monarchy in Spain and set in place institutions such that ‘wealth-
maximizing behaviour by organizations and entrepreneurs (political and
4 ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love,
and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages’ (Book I, Chapter II); ‘… by directing that
industry in such amanner as its producemay be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention’ (Book IV, Chapter II).
5 Competition also has a more controversial claim to political beneﬁts, in particular the promotion of
freedom. On this view, it does more than deliver the best opportunity to satisfy consumer wants – it is also
desirable because it allows individuals to make their own choices (even if those choices may be against
their own best interests). Hayek (1960) makes the classic case and Sen (1993) provides a recent critique.
The political beneﬁts are also stressed in German ordo-liberalism where the beneﬁts are expected not
through individual choice but through the avoidance of a political process dominated by monopolies
hand in hand with government (see Gerber, 1998).
6 A second fundamental theorem proves that concerns about social inequality should not undermine the
attractions of efﬁcient competitive markets as long as there are suitable tax and social insurance schemes.
7 For example, see Schumpeter (1943) on competition as ‘creative destruction’; also Kirzner (1978) on
entrepreneurship and competition. See also section 2.
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economic) entailed getting control of, or inﬂuence over, the bureaucratic
machinery’ (i.e. competition was diverted away from satisfying customers
and into gaining political inﬂuence). The consequent, contrasting economic
development of America north and south of the Rio Grande is clear to all.
Back in Europe, the former command economies of central and eastern
Europe provided a natural experiment lasting over forty years in the second
half of the twentieth century. Contrast the fortunes of Poland and Spain.8 Both
countries were Catholic and had populations of around 25million in the 1950s
(and 40million by the end of the century!). They had similar geographic areas
and agricultural economies. In 1950, Poland had a per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) of around $750 and Spain only $500. Over the next forty years,
Poland was a highly centralised economy with little room for competitive
markets. Spain’s economic system was market based.9 By 1990, when Polish
communism formally ended, Spanish per capita GDP was four times higher
than in Poland. The comparative evolution of the communist command
economy of East Germany and the social market economy of West
Germany over the same period provides an even sharper contrast of fortunes.
This is not to say that competitive markets solve all economic problems.
They do not. As we shall see in the next section, there are occasions when
some apparent restrictions of competition can be justiﬁed. Furthermore,
competition appears to create some problems when inefﬁcient ﬁrms lay off
workers and successful ﬁrms pay huge bonuses to senior managers while their
activities deplete resources and contribute to climate change. Complementary
economic and social policies are essential to create a pleasant and sustainable
society. This is not the place to develop the economics of unemployment,
environmental pollution and social equity, though these are important issues.
The point to note is that they are best addressed by complementary policies of
education, environmental regulation, taxation and social insurance, but not by
abandoning competitive markets.
These broad-sweep ideas and observations establish the ﬁrm presumption
that a broadly competitive market economy has very much more to recom-
mend it than one dominated by central planning or monopoly. However,
there are numerous possible variants of a market system and many were tried
across Europe in the second half of the twentieth century (and not just eastern
communism versus western markets). Within western Europe there were
8 See Sachs (1993).
9 Though economic and political freedom were severely compromised by Franco’s dictatorship until his
death in 1975.
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national differences in degrees of state ownership and state subsidies to private
business, price, entry and trade regulation, and policies in relation to cartels.
The evidence mounted that state ownership was less efﬁcient than private
ownership and from the 1980s privatisation began to roll across Europe,
reaching the East in the 1990s following the collapse of communism.
Another inﬂuence around this time was the single European market pro-
gramme, which aimed to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade within the
European Community. Further reforms liberalised entry into previously
regulated markets. One high-proﬁle example was the deregulation of airline
competition and consequent appearance of low-cost airlines using a very
different business model to the very uniform product previously offered by
national ﬂag carriers. There are continuing moves to deregulate in other areas
such as energy. Further EU initiatives have attempted to reduce the impact of
state subsidies, at least inasmuch as they distort competition between ﬁrms
located in different Member States.10
While many national differences remain, there is an increasing European
consensus that a prosperous economy responsive to consumer needs is best
achieved by private ownership, deregulation of entry and a limit on state
subsidies (at least when given by other countries!).11 Of course, this is a
multifariously interpreted consensus that is characteristic of the cultural
cassoulet that is Europe.
The issue then becomes: should ﬁrms be left completely free to compete as and
how they wish, or would complete laissez-faire result in ﬁrms themselves
subverting the competitive process? The pressure on ﬁrms to maximise proﬁts
provides an alert to the dangers. Business life is much easier if competition is
suppressed, even if it is also less productive and less creative. This observation
is not new. Adam Smith recognised it back in 1776 when he wrote about the
enduring temptation to ﬁx prices.12 Although it can be hard for ﬁrms to act on
10 See Davies et al. (2004) for some interesting, accessible case studies of the beneﬁts of deregulating markets.
11 See Megginson and Netter (2001) for a review of the empirical literature on the ownership effects of
privatisation. Nickell (1996) provides an example of evidence that competition enhances productivity,
and Aghion et al. (2004) of evidence showing how foreign entry raises domestic productivity.
12 ‘People of the same trade seldommeet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices’ (Smith, 1776, Book I,
Chapter X). He was less optimistic about the ability to legislate against such conspiracies. His next
sentence reads: ‘It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be
executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the
same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies;
much less to render them necessary.’ Modern advocates of competition policy are less pessimistic.
Although the law in a free society indeed cannot prevent meetings, it can try to stop competitors
discussing price when they meet.
5 Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/386783/WORKINGFOLDER/LYO/9780521886048INT.3D 6 [1–22] 16.6.2009 11:16AM
these temptations, especially if the number of rivals is high or entry is easy,
some form of referee is necessary to stop the invisible hand turning into a ﬁst.
To understand the referee’s role, we need to dig deeper into the operation of
individual markets.
2. Understanding business practices and market competition
The economics of industrial organisation (IO) provides a detailed theoretical
and empirical understanding of how ﬁrms compete, whether it be in natural
resource, manufacturing, utility, retailing or other service markets. The theory
develops how rational proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms must be expected to behave in
markets with a limited number of ﬁrms (i.e. oligopolies). Since senior managers
are under a ﬁduciary duty to their shareholders to maximise shareholder
value, it is reasonable to assume that this is the way that experiencedmanagers
will indeed behave. But if they are tempted to relax or pursue non-proﬁt
objectives, there are other pressures that encourage them back to proﬁt:
supervision and performance monitoring within the ﬁrm, incentive schemes
(e.g. bonuses, share options), internal promotion and external job offers for
the most successful managers, threat of takeover by a more proﬁt-oriented
management team and natural selection in a competitive product market.
Themost familiar issue investigated in IO is how the power to set price above
cost is related to the number and relative size of ﬁrms in the market.13 Price is
always a core element of competition but it is rarely the only element. The
literature has been developed to understand a very wide range of strategies used
by ﬁrms. It investigates how ﬁrms compete when they choose prices, including
price discrimination, quantity and bundling discounts and price restraints and
guarantees, product design, quality and range, investments in capacity, distri-
bution, marketing and research and development (R&D), the range of produc-
tion and distribution activities undertaken within the ﬁrm, and the nature and
content of contracts entered into with customers, other ﬁrms as suppliers, or
joint ventures. IO investigates the optimal choice by each ﬁrm, the ramiﬁcations
and responses of its rivals, and how these can be anticipated. Thus, even when
each ﬁrm makes its decisions unilaterally, the whole market is affected and we
13 The coremodelling technique originates fromCournot (1838), but Adam Smith already had the nub of the
idea: ‘If this capital [i.e. relevant assets sufﬁcient to trade in a town] is divided between two different grocers,
their competitionwill tend tomake both of them sell cheaper, than if it were in the hands of one only; and if
it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just somuch the greater, and the chance of their
combining together, in order to raise the price, just so much the less.’ As quoted in Stigler (1987).
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are interested in working out the implications for all ﬁrms and consumers
once everyone has adjusted their pricing and other relevant decisions.14
Each market has different characteristics which inﬂuence the strategies
ﬁrms choose and the competitiveness of outcomes. Such characteristics include
the degree of production and distribution economies of scale and scope, avail-
ability of risk capital, technology, scarce skills and management expertise,
market size, other entry barriers and the number of ﬁrms, scale, stability and
lumpiness of demand, knowledge, sensitivity and rationality of consumer
behaviour, consumer network beneﬁts or switching costs, potential for tech-
nological improvement, scope and security of intellectual property rights,
technological lock-in, transaction costs of doing business with other ﬁrms,
contract, competition, trade and other laws, and market history. IO theory
now provides a large and expanding toolkit for the analysis of markets with
different blends of such characteristics.15
One preliminary insight is that some apparently quite different business
practices can be equivalent in their effects. As a very simple example, suppose
a supplier wants a retailer to charge no more than a certain maximum price
when selling its product. If the demand curve is known, then the supplier
could achieve exactly the same effect by requiring the retailer to sell an
equivalent minimum quantity. A maximum price or a minimum quantity
are alternatives that are equivalent in their effects.16 The importance of this is
that a poorly designed competition policy may both prohibit resale price
restrictions and allow quantity incentives. Even without considering whether
intervention against such strategies is desirable, we can say that it is incon-
sistent to outlaw one and permit the other.
Other insights relate to pricing and investment incentives. For example, the
time and effort needed to develop a new product may not be forthcoming if
14 An outcome such that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate from its current strategy is known as a Nash
equilibrium. A companion concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is appropriate when ﬁrms
make long-term investment or product design decisions in anticipation of the consequences for future
pricing behaviour.
15 An introduction to IO theory can be found in a number of textbooks and handbooks. Tirole (1989) is
old, but it remains as a classic on the modern foundations of industrial organisation theory. Church and
Ware (2000) is more recent and more applied. Motta (2004) is most recent and most direct in applying
the approach of IO to competition policy issues. Three volumes ofHandbook of Industrial Organization
(Schmalensee andWillig, 1989, and Armstrong and Porter, 2007) include some excellent review articles.
Less demanding textbooks that still provide good introductions to industrial economics at a level similar
to the exposition in this book include Cabral (2000), which has a more European perspective than others
such as Carlton and Perloff (2000) or Pepall et al. (2008). Klein and Lerner (2008) provide a useful
compilation of classic journal articles.
16 Quantity discounts can also have an equivalent effect, though none of these strategies is exactly
equivalent if the demand curve is uncertain.
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non-inventors can immediately copy someone else’s invention. This is famil-
iar as the justiﬁcation of patents (i.e. time-limited monopoly rights). Similarly,
expert advice, samples and other services provided ‘free’ by some retailers
would not be sustainable if low-service retailers can undercut price and free-
ride. This loss of marketing support might be solved by certain types of
exclusionary behaviour: refusing to sell through low-service retailers ensures
that high-quality retailers capture the beneﬁt of their investment in premises
and training. Economic analysis can help distinguish such cases from others
where refusal to deal is just a means of preserving or enhancing market power.
Empirical substance to IO theories is provided by a large body of econo-
metric studies that tests theoretical predictions and identiﬁes other patterns to
explain. A general ﬁnding is that, just as the theory suggests, market outcomes
are highly sensitive to the speciﬁc characteristics of the market. This means
that there are no simple rules like ‘four ﬁrms are necessary (or sufﬁcient) for
effective competition’ or ‘50 per cent market share is necessary (or sufﬁcient)
for a ﬁrm to be able to raise price substantially above the competitive level’.
Nevertheless, there is much empirical knowledge relating to competition and
productivity growth,17 pricing,18 entry, exit and market concentration,19
contracts and investment,20 and experimental markets.21
There is space to provide only one illustrative example of this rich econo-
metric literature. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) investigate ﬁve retail and pro-
fessional service markets in around 150 isolated American towns of varying
sizes. Entry barriers are low in these markets but each ﬁrm must incur some
ﬁxed costs. As expected, the authors ﬁnd that larger towns can support more
ﬁrms in each product market, but how many more? If price did not fall with
entry, the number of ﬁrms should be proportional to market size, but if each
extra ﬁrm introduces more competition such that price and margins fall, then
greater sales for each ﬁrm will be needed to cover ﬁxed costs. Consequently,
the greater the competitive effect of entry, the larger must be the incremental
size of market in order to support that entry. Using this insight, they ﬁnd that
reasonably competitive outcomes can be established by a market structure of
between two and four ﬁrms. Thus, we learn that, even for reasonably similar
types of market, different numbers of ﬁrms may be necessary to establish
17 See Ahn (2002) for a review.
18 See Berry and Reiss (2007) and Hendricks and Porter (2007) for partial reviews. There is also much
econometric work on collusion and cartel behaviour, as well as numerous case studies (e.g. on airline
pricing).
19 See Berry and Reiss (2007) and Sutton (2007) for reviews.
20 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a review.
21 See Holt (1995) and selective reviews in Plott and Smith (2008).
8 Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/386783/WORKINGFOLDER/LYO/9780521886048INT.3D 9 [1–22] 16.6.2009 11:16AM
competition and this number may be as small as two. However, it would be
unwise to project this ﬁnding on ﬁrm numbers into a wider generalisation for
more complex markets; for example, these small-scale trades were chosen
because they operate in the shadow of a fairly immediate threat of entry.
Furthermore, more differentiated product markets may require more ﬁrms to
establish a competitive outcome.
The IO approach also provides a guide to deﬁning a meaningful market.
This is important because market deﬁnition is not usually as clear-cut as well-
deﬁned trades in isolated towns. There are always two dimensions to be
assessed: the range of products that compete and the geographic extent of
the market. How can we determine, for example, whether apples and bananas
are in the same market? Some people will ﬁnd them close substitutes as
healthy snack fruits but others will have a strong personal preference (e.g. it
takes good teeth to bite into a crisp apple). Economic meaning can be put into
the issue by asking whether a hypothetical monopolist of bananas would be
able to raise price without so many consumers switching to other fruit such
that this price rise would be unproﬁtable. If the answer is yes, then bananas
can be considered to be a separate market, but if the answer is no, then the
bananamarket is too narrowly deﬁned for competition purposes so we need to
consider a wider deﬁnition (e.g. bananas and apples). Starting from a narrow
product market, potential substitutes can be added until the hypothetical
monopolist could proﬁtably raise price. This approach to market deﬁnition
gets to the heart of its use to understand competition. A similar approach can
be applied to geographic market deﬁnition by asking: would a hypothetical
monopolist in Germany be able to raise price without losing customers to
French or Dutch ﬁrms?
This summary of IO analysis has so far focused on understanding the world
that we observe. It can also help in passing judgement: would a feasible
intervention in the market improve social welfare? This gets to the core of
the economic analysis necessary for good competition policy. Consumer
welfare is measured by consumer surplus (i.e. the excess of consumer
willingness-to-pay over what they actually have to pay) and producer welfare
is measured by proﬁts (which may be distributed to shareholders or shared
with employees). Total welfare refers to the sum of the two. It is a virtue of the
approach that the welfare of consumers and ﬁrms can be analysed separately
and then an evaluation can be made using an appropriate weighting.22
22 See Farrell and Katz (2006) for a discussion of appropriate welfare objectives in the context of competi-
tion policy.
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As an example of this welfare approach, consider a horizontal agreement
between ﬁrms to share a market according to regions. This conveys monopoly
power in each region and raises prices and proﬁts for all ﬁrms. However,
consumer surplus falls and the standard monopoly analysis shows that con-
sumers lose more than the ﬁrms gain. Next, consider a vertical agreement
between a manufacturer and a supplier. This might take many forms, but as a
freely negotiated deal it must be expected to raise proﬁts for both. However,
unlike a cartel, this need not come at the expense of the manufacturer’s
customers. In fact, they may beneﬁt if some of the efﬁciency is passed through
as a price cut. This suggests a very different welfare analysis and consequent
policy stance towards horizontal and vertical restraints. Similar considera-
tions apply to horizontal compared with vertical mergers. Nevertheless, there
are speciﬁable circumstances where a vertical restraint or vertical merger may
foreclose rivals and harm consumers. By the 1970s, the Chicago School had
highlighted the benign features of vertical restraints but had used restrictive
assumptions to get the message across. More nuanced game theoretic analysis
began to pick away at the potential for foreclosure and it is only from the 1990s
that a signiﬁcant post-Chicago consensus has begun to develop.23
The next step is to formulate the economic analysis in a way suitable for
legal scrutiny.
3. Harm and redemption in competition analysis
Modern competition policy is about refereeing free markets to ensure there is
no foul play. The idea is to let those offering the best deal win customers. To
pursue the sporting analogy, competition economics appraises tackles so that
the competition is robust and exciting without breaking down into lethargy,
match ﬁxing or kicking the other side off the ﬁeld.24 If there is an offence, the
referee has to decide how serious it is and how to deal with it most effectively.
It is not the referee’s job to protect weak competitors from losing. The best
referees blow their whistles infrequently but are ﬁrm and clear in their
decisions when they do. They gain the respect of the players, foul play is
deterred and there should be little for them to do except to observe the game
very closely. I start with markets where it is not possible to create a sufﬁciently
level playing ﬁeld for a competitive game to begin.
23 See Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) for a history of economic ideas in relation to US antitrust policy.
24 Competition economics can also advise on best rules for the game (e.g. guidelines for implementing
competition policy). This book focuses on the role as referee.
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Markets where competition is not feasible. Some markets are natural mono-
polies in the sense that economies of scale are so large relative to the size of the
market that only one ﬁrm can supply at reasonable cost efﬁciency. This can
arise particularly with major distributional infrastructures like electricity, gas
or water networks. Conventional competition cannot be created in such
markets, so it is necessary to regulate price and other aspects of their invest-
ment programme and service quality.25 Sometimes the domain of natural
monopoly can be reduced by vertical separation. For example, ownership of
electricity generation can be separated from the distribution network as a ﬁrst
step to creating a competitive market in generation. A deep-rooted problem
with price regulation is that a regulator knows less than the regulated ﬁrm
about its costs, demand and technological and market opportunities. This
makes it extremely difﬁcult to set the right price without eroding efﬁciency
and innovation incentives – price regulation should be applied only when
strictly necessary. The economics of the pricing game between regulator and
regulated is quite different to that between ﬁrms and it lies outside the scope of
this book.26
This leaves us with the ﬁeld of play for competition policy. Our agenda lies
between the levels of control implied by full economic regulation and com-
plete laissez faire. It is relevant for that preponderant part of the economy
where markets work pretty well, but where it may be possible for ﬁrms to
subvert competition by creating or abusing market power.27 It is possible to
categorise a number of ways in which competition may be harmed.
Unilateral effects. A ﬁrm may act alone to raise price. When it does, this is
likely to have a knock-on effect for other ﬁrms which ﬁnd it proﬁtable to raise
price probably by a little less. Consumer harm may also come through non-
price elements of the product offer (e.g. reduced service support or product
development). It is sometimes also argued that price discrimination can be
abusive, but the circumstances always require very careful analysis.28
Cartels and coordinated effects. A group of ﬁrms may coordinate to raise
price. This is known as a cartel if they coordinate explicitly (e.g. by exchanging
information about price intentions or coming to a verbal agreement to share
the market). It is known as tacit collusion or ‘coordinated effects’ if they do so
25 It may be possible to create competition for the market by an appropriate auction of monopoly rights,
but this still requires a regulatory apparatus of the sort discussed in this paragraph.
26 See Armstrong and Sappington (2007) and Laffont and Tirole (1993) for the economics of regulation.
Price regulation is not entirely missing from this book because it can be used to remedy a speciﬁc
problem in an otherwise competitive market (e.g. see Chapters 3 and 7).
27 See Geroski (2004).
28 See Chapters 1, 4, 9 and most explicitly 11 for a discussion of those circumstances.
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without explicit contact (e.g. by observing each other’s behaviour and with-
holding from competitive pricing). The latter is far harder to achieve than
explicit collusion, but both result in higher prices than if each ﬁrm acts
unilaterally.29
Horizontal mergers that eliminate an actual or potential competitor.30 The
reduction of competition depends on the extent to which product ranges are
viewed by customers as substitutes and the effectiveness of remaining rivals at
ﬁlling the competitive gap. The merger may enhance unilateral effects (e.g. by
reducing the loss of sales following a price rise) or coordinated effects (e.g.
by eliminating a ‘maverick’ price cutter). It may also have a positive side if
it facilitates synergies and so enables the merged ﬁrm to compete more
effectively.
Strategies that reduce competition by excluding rivals (known as foreclosure).
The unilateral market power of an incumbent is indirectly enhanced by
strategies that deter entry, force exit or raise a rival’s costs. These are known
as exclusionary abuses. For example, exclusive contracts may be signed to
reduce a rival’s purchasing options or customer opportunities or to raise their
supply prices; rebates and quantity discounts or product bundling may also be
used to squeeze market opportunities for rivals; or a vertically integrated ﬁrm
may refuse to deal with an upstream or downstream rival. A vertical merger
may similarly enhance the prospect of foreclosure. Alternatively, a ﬁrm may
make its core product incompatible with a rival’s complementary range or a
few ﬁrms may agree an industry standard that disadvantages a rival. The
problem is that it is also quite possible for these forms of behaviour to be
beneﬁcial for consumers, even if competitors are harmed (see Section 2). This
makes the analysis of such strategies highly contentious in competition
analysis and they require particularly careful economic analysis.31
Strategies that soften competition between existing rivals. A ﬁrm may take
actions or invest to reduce the incentive for ﬁrms in the market to compete for
customers. For example, it may differentiate its products so as to make them
less close substitutes to those offered by others. Alternatively, it may build
limited capacity so it has no great incentive to capture customers from rivals.
29 In terms of IO theory, a unilateral effect is a Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game and a coordinated
effect is a higher-price equilibrium in the repeated game.
30 We use the term ‘merger’ to include acquisitions of individual businesses from another ﬁrm or a joint
venture that could have been an independent business.
31 It is also possible that a ﬁrm may set prices below-cost for sufﬁcient time to force exit, or invest in excess
capacity to threaten a predatory response to entry. However, closer economic scrutiny of predatory
pricing suggests this type of behaviour is rarely rational unless reputation effects carry over to other
markets.
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Another example is a commitment to match a rival’s price, which undermines
the rival’s incentive to cut price in the ﬁrst place. However, it is extremely
difﬁcult to distinguish competition suppression of this type from active
competition, natural caution or customer service.32
Customers can soften or stiffen competition. The behaviour of customers
plays a crucial role in incentivising ﬁrms to compete. Competition relies on
them responding to price differences and switching between the offerings of
rival ﬁrms. However, particularly if the customers are ﬁnal consumers, they do
not always have the time, ability or inclination to search for the best offer.
Even if aware of a better offer, they may be deterred by the risk and cost of
switching brand or supplier. While ﬁrms cannot be held responsible for
consumer ignorance or sloth, they can exploit it if they act to obfuscate choices
or make switching difﬁcult. This is an area of increasing research and rele-
vance to competition policy. Yet customers can stiffen competition by nego-
tiating discounts or by creating the conditions for ﬁerce competition
(e.g. putting a large contract to tender). Thus, buyer power can reduce or
eliminate failings in upstream competition.33
Having identiﬁed channels of harm, we can turn to redemption. If the
economic analysis reveals that a business practice is harmful to competition,
what should be done about it? For some practices, most notably price-ﬁxing
cartels, there is no saving grace and they should clearly be prohibited.
However, for other practices (e.g. restrictive contracts and mergers), there
may be parts that are problematic and other parts that cause no competitive
harm. In such cases, it is often possible to eliminate the harm while allowing
the unproblematic part to proceed. This might be achieved by requiring the
parties to a horizontal merger to divest overlaps in their product ranges while
allowing other parts of the merger to proceed. In vertical mergers, or where a
vertically integrated dominant ﬁrm is excluding competitors by refusing
access to an essential asset, the concerns may be alleviated by requiring the
ﬁrm to grant access to competitors on appropriate terms. In the case of
restrictive contracts, it may be possible to limit duration or change particular
terms in order to retain beneﬁcial incentives while eliminating the damage to
competition.
While it is crucial that a remedy should be effective in eliminating the
competitive harm, success should not be penalised and wise policy follows a
principle of minimum necessary intervention. It is the essence of competition
32 But see Chapter 3 for an example where such behaviour was at least discussed.
33 Chapter 4 discusses whether buyer power can be abused.
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that ﬁrms should seek to produce more efﬁciently, to entice customers to buy
from them and to experiment with novel strategies. An important way in
which the law brings some balance between the general incentive to compete
and the speciﬁc strategy under scrutiny is to take account of how market
power has been achieved.
This is best illustrated by thinking about high prices associated with high
market shares. A similar market structure andmarket power might be achieved
by a single large ﬁrm with a 50 per cent market share, or a tight cartel with the
same share and product range, or a horizontal merger creating the same share
and range. The ﬁrst of these may have achieved market share over time by
controlling costs, providing a product consumers want and being an effective
competitor. We still need to be alert to potential abuses of this market
position, but investigation can await a serious complaint. The merger must
come under routine scrutiny because it is not the result of customer choice.
Nevertheless, they may provide a quick way to achieve synergies which
ultimately do beneﬁt customers. A classic cartel, however, can have no such
justiﬁcation as it does not have the possibility of creating efﬁciencies and is in
place only tomake life easy for ﬁrms and to exploit consumers. This underpins
per se illegality and tough enforcement including active policies to encourage
cartel discovery.
Having set out the economic approach to competition policy, we can now
see how this ﬁts in with the law and practice that have evolved in Europe.
4. Competition policy in Europe34
Competition policy is the set of laws, institutions, precedent, analysis, guidelines
and evolving regulatory practice that aims to prevent ﬁrms from subverting
competition. Americans refer to this as ‘antitrust policy’. Few of the original
laws were motivated by the single purpose of protecting competition. There
have also beenmany national differences across Europe. A brief diversion into
US competition policy provides some perspective.
In the US, the Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited cartels and ‘monopolisation’
strategies (roughly equivalent to ‘abuse of dominance’ in Europe). It provided
for criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, and gave powers to break up
34 Some of the histories in this section rely on the OECD Reviews of Competition Policy Frameworks,
including EU (2005), France (2003), Germany (2004) and UK (2005). Motta (2004) Chapter 1 provides
an extended introduction to the US and EU.
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dominant ﬁrms. In 1914, the Clayton Act provided for merger control and
treble damages for private actions (i.e. actions not instigated by a government
agency). It also introduced the control of price discrimination. The interpreta-
tion of this powerful set of laws has evolved substantially over the last century.
Until the 1970s, the laws were used to protect small competitors and restrain
large corporations, as well as to control cartels. There was sometimes an
aversion to efﬁciency-creating practices, including mergers, even for ﬁrms
with negligible market power because these might harm rivals. A substantial
number of business practices became per se illegal, so could not be used even
when they enhanced efﬁciency. Since then, however, there has been a funda-
mental, though incomplete, shift towards a ‘rule of reason’ or ‘economic
effects’ approach. The struggle for the ascendancy of the economic approach
can be seen in the cases in Kwoka and White (1989 and later editions).
Competition policy in Europe is more recent, as is the economic effects-
based approach to its implementation. Also, the absence of treble damages has
left enforcement in the hands of competition authorities, while many actions
in the US are taken privately. The following review does not cover differences
in institutions, legal traditions or the relationship between agencies and
courts. It focuses on the evolution of the role of competition policy and the
place of economic analysis. It aims to show how the latter is achieving an
increasingly important role across Europe.
The most inﬂuential competition policy has developed at the EU level,
which has also proved the model for reform in current and aspirant Member
States. It started with the original EU Treaty in 1957. This included key
Articles 81 and 82 prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and the abuse of
a dominant position.35 The Treaty also had provisions for liberalisation
of markets, equal application to state-owned and private ﬁrms, and control
of state aid. A major theme has been the use of competition provisions to
pursue the objective of an integrated European market.36 In 1957, there were
only sixMember States, but three waves of expansion during 1973–95 brought
in most west European countries and most of the former communist central
Europe was embraced during 2004–7.
35 These Articles were originally numbered 85 and 86. Key elements of the competition policy were already
established in relation to coal and steel under the Treaty of Paris (1951). To avoid confusion, I refer in
this chapter to the political and economic entity of the European Community since its inception as the
European Union (EU), even though that name dates only from 1993. The Treaty is more usually referred
to as the EC Treaty. However, I reserve ‘EC’ for the executive and administrative institutions of the
European Commission, particularly DG Competition (previously DG IV) located in Brussels.
36 See Chapter 11 for an example of the conﬂict between integration and economic effects as objectives.
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The provisions of the EU Treaty on restrictive agreements and abuse of
dominance were activated in 1962 in a way that centralised enforcement in the
European Commission (EC).37 Implementation was initially slow and rule
based, and there was little activity on cartels. Fines for violating prohibitions
could theoretically be as much as 10 per cent of turnover, but high ﬁnes were
rare until very recently. Even comparing the 2000s (up to mid-2008) with the
1990s, the number of prosecuted cartels has trebled and the value of ﬁnes has
risen ﬁfteen-fold. Explicit merger regulation was not passed until 1989 but it
soon became established as an active area with the ability to meet tight
deadlines. It also proved a seedbed for new ideas.38 The economic approach
to mergers, agreements and abuse of dominance has pervaded a growing set
of ofﬁcial guidelines on how competition analysis should be done. Important
examples includemarket deﬁnition (1997), vertical restraints (2000), horizontal
cooperation agreements (2001), horizontal mergers (2004), non-horizontal
mergers (2007) and exclusionary abuses by dominant ﬁrms (2008).39 Note
the important economic distinction between horizontal and vertical (non-
horizontal) issues, which is not apparent in the original law. Last but not least,
the economic approach has also received important support and impetus
from some appeal decisions by the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ).40
The year 2004 saw the implementation of a series of major reforms that
reinforced the economic approach and pushed it out to Member States.
Member States were enabled to enforce the full treaty provisions on agree-
ments between ﬁrms and required to appraise agreements in the same way
as the EC. The European Competition Network of National Competition
Authorities was created to share best practice. Reform of the merger regime
included a symbolic change in wording of the substantive test from
‘dominance’ to a ‘signiﬁcant impediment to effective competition’; although
37 The ﬁrst Commissioner for DG Competition (then known as DG IV) was German and the next four
were Dutch or Luxembourgeois. Part of the competition culture they brought was inﬂuenced by that in
their home countries; see the following paragraphs. The sixth was an Irishman who, as a member of the
reforming Delors Commission in the late 1980s, introduced merger regulation at the European level.
38 See Lyons (2007) for a review of EC merger control.
39 These are all available on the DG Competition website.
40 For the role of the courts and the evolution of precedent, see Furse (2006), Jones and Sufrin (2007) or
Whish (2008). Essentially, the EC makes decisions which can be appealed by interested parties to the
CFI. The CFI conducts a judicial review of the decision to ensure that it is well argued and takes proper
account of the evidence. If it thinks this has not been done, it uses language like ‘this part of the decision
is vitiated with manifest error’ and refers it back to the EC for proper consideration. The CFI does not
replace the EC’s economic judgement but it does clarify appropriate principles for analysis. A further
appeal over the CFI decision can be made to the ECJ.
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the practical impact is likely to be modest, it signals a clearer emphasis
on economic effects. The new post of Chief Competition Economist was
created, with ﬁxed three-year terms for a leading academic IO economist to
advise the Commissioner on policy and the Commission on cases. The chief
economist was also given a permanent team of around twenty PhD trained
economists to advise case teams.41 Thus, the economic approach has become
embedded.42
The Treaty’s competition law applies only to activities that may affect trade
between Member States. Although this has been interpreted quite widely, it
still leaves much room for national policies. The main elements of modern
German competition law were established in the same year as the original EU
Treaty but the motivation was different. Historically, German law permitted
registered cartels, which were legally enforceable until forbidden by the
occupying forces after World War II. The disasters of the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century had culminated in an unholy alliance between Nazism, big
business and cartels. In response, an intellectual movement known as ordo-
liberalism saw strong competition policy as essential to protect individual
freedom and to act as a bulwark against political and corporate repression. In
order not to be corruptible, ordo-liberals argued that policy should be imple-
mented formulaically and without discretion. The Act against Restraints of
Competition (ARC) was passed in 1957, since when the independent
Bundeskartellamt enforces a ban on cartels, controls the abuse of a dominant
position and since 1973 controls mergers. This history has resulted in strong
policy implementation that has been market share and form based, leaving
little room for more nuanced economic analysis. A 1999 ARC amendment
brought the law into line with Articles 81 and 82.43
41 There is also an advisory group of academic IO economists, Economic Advisory Group on Competition
Policy (EAGCP), with a mandate to support DG Competition in its economic reasoning and to provide
advice to the Commissioner on topics of special interest. Written advice is published on the DG
Competition website. Eight of the thirteen members of the current EAGCP are authors of chapters in
this book, as is the current Chief Competition Economist.
42 Neven (2006) provides a fascinating analysis of this process, including the evolving case law. One
illustrative statistic he compiled relates to the rise of specialist consultancies providing economic advice
on competition issues in Europe. Prior to 1994, their turnover was less than £1million p.a. Turnover
grew to £7million in 1999, after which it more than trebled by 2004. It has almost certainly grown
signiﬁcantly since then. Part of this was driven by an increase in cases, but not all of it. Over the same
period, the economics advice share of professional fees (including legal advice) rose from around
5 per cent to 15 per cent, which was similar to the share in US cases. See also Vives (2009) for a series
of reviews of and reﬂections on the ﬁrst half century of EC competition policy.
43 The Dutch preference for cartels lasted much longer than in Germany. Dutch competition law for most
of the twentieth century was honoured only in its breach. Numerous cartels riddled the economy and
private and public regulation often controlled entry. Signiﬁcant reform in the 1990s culminated in the
establishment of a new enforcement agency, the NMa, in 1998.
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Meanwhile, the UK, which did not join the European Community until
1973, was developing its own traditions. War and recession in the ﬁrst half of
the twentieth century saw the previous century’s liberalism descend into
restrictive practices and cartels, often with state collaboration. In 1948, an
Act established a commission to investigate monopolies and restrictive prac-
tices, with the apparent aim to reduce unemployment.44 The Commission was
to have little effect until given powers of merger control. The lack of genuine
concern for competition was demonstrated by the associated nationalisation
programme that was creating public monopolies. A restrictive practices court
was set up in 1956 and was a considerable success in eliminating explicit
cartels.45 Merger control was introduced in 1965, the Ofﬁce of Fair Trading
was established in 1973 and there was other piecemeal legislation up to 1980
which created a rather unfocused set of laws. Policy was based on a ‘public
interest’ test which was primarily interpreted on competition grounds but
could include other issues such as employment or regional matters. Price
controls and government-sponsored industrial restructuring prevailed until
the late 1970s. From the mid-1980s, a radical programme of privatisation put
highly concentrated markets and monopolies in private hands, supervised by
a set of specialist regulators. Other potentially competitive markets were
deregulated. A ministerial declaration stated that the public interest was to
be interpreted in terms of competition alone (i.e. economic effects). Two
major reforms brought much-needed consolidation of this tangle of legisla-
tion and replaced the ‘public interest’ with explicit competition tests: the
Competition Act (1998) introduced the EU prohibitions and ﬁnes for anti-
competitive practices and abuse of dominance and the Enterprise Act (2002)
greatly stiffened penalties for cartels (e.g. gaol sentences and disqualiﬁcation
from directorships) and introduced formal competition tests for mergers and
market investigations. The latter have been a long-standing and distinctive
feature of UK competition policy.
France can lay claim to one of the earliest competition laws when the
Revolution listened to Adam Smith and prohibited cartels in 1791. This was
incorporated into the Napoleonic Code but fell into disuse during the nine-
teenth century. Post-World War II legislation included the principle of abuse
of dominance and merger control, but implementation was weak and second-
ary to bureaucratic direction of the economy, state ownership and the creation
44 See Wilks (1999).
45 Covert cartels were another matter. The punishment for cartel membership was that you had to promise
not to do it again – and you could be punished for contempt of court only if you did.
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of national champions. A marked change in the consensus was manifested in
the 1986 ordonnance on competition and freedom, which set out to raise
competition above administrative intervention, incorporated the competition
provisions of the EU Treaty and established a more powerful Conseil de la
Concurrence. More recent reforms have made merger control more indepen-
dent and the economic approach is gaining ground. Nevertheless, there
remains a political distrust of competition and approval for common pricing
as an expression of equality and social solidarity. Substantial state ownership
also remains with full or controlling interests in leading ﬁrms ranging from
utilities to manufacturing and transport.
Italy, like France, has a long tradition of pervasive state intervention and
ownership in large-scale industries. The economy is also riddled with regula-
tions on pricing, entry and product quality. The complexity is greatly
increased by the devolved powers of the regional governments. There was
no tradition of competition policy until the 1990 Competition Act establishing
a new Antitrust Authority. Although the new law’s objectives are formally
very broad public interest, the new authority has established early credentials
for a competition focus.
Most other European countries also came late to national competition
legislation but now have it in place and, with many national quirks, attempt
to emulate methods of analysis similar to those of the EC. The same applies to
both east and west. The collapse of the former communist regimes of east and
central Europe brought new competition laws echoing those in the EU Treaty
as a way to consolidate and protect the new economic freedoms (e.g. Hungary
and Poland both introduced new laws in 1990).
Over the last ten years, the rhetoric of the economic approach has arrived.
The implementation still has a long way to go. This is demonstrated by a
number of the case studies in this book. Each European country also has its
own idiosyncrasies and there is much progress still to be made. However,
there is a clear direction of travel and the pace is picking up.
What has driven this? As the above accounts of different regimes show, the
EC has had a powerful demonstration role. Adoption of an EC-style policy has
also become a necessary condition for accession to the EU. But that does not
explain why the EC practice evolved this way or why many Member States
have supported this evolution and others have not fought too hard against it.
Globalisation has been another force. Merging ﬁrms now need to get anti-
competition clearance from several countries and this is much easier if a similar
approach is used in each jurisdiction. Given the trend in US implementation
since the 1980s, there is much corporate support for a similar trend in Europe.
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However, the common force operating for convergence of competition
appraisal across Europe and America has been the convergence of economic
ideas since the 1970s. The academic ideas of IO economists have converged
with the unifying application of game theory as a tool for understanding how
ﬁrms interact in markets, and the use of econometrics to test and measure the
impact of such theories. The research and textbooks mentioned in section 2 of
this chapter are used internationally, students attend universities interna-
tionally and professional competition economists in agencies, consultancies
and universities increasingly work internationally. This is a very powerful
community of ideas that is illustrated further by the international authorship
of this book and the shared mode of analysis with Kwoka and White’s
American authors. It does not mean that all economists agree in each case,
but it does mean that most disagreement is over the facts more than the
mode of analysis. This consistent message has proved persuasive in getting
more economists appointed to competition agencies and in lawyers wanting
to listen to and comprehend their analysis.46 Economists still have to work
harder to explain the economic approach in a way that is compelling in
a legal process.47 I hope this book demonstrates that we are improving in
this task.
5. Organisation of this book
There are several ways in which a book of case studies might be organised. A
very traditional book on industrial economics might have arranged them by
industry classiﬁcation (e.g. manufacturing, services). This would focus on the
particular circumstances of individual industries. However, competition
issues cut right across industrial classiﬁcation, so this would provide little
help to the reader interested in the economic analysis. Nevertheless, we have
provided a table of contents by market to guide the reader who is interested in
particular sectors of the economy.
A more attractive organisation might be according to the form of poten-
tially anticompetitive business practice at issue (e.g. pricing practices, product
strategies). This would have the virtue of collecting together similar types of
economic analysis and it would map more closely into a modern IO textbook.
46 The UK has been particularly enlightened in appointing leading IO economists to head its agencies,
including four of the last ﬁve heads of the Ofﬁce of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition
Commission.
47 See Vickers (2006), who succinctly discusses this and a number of other themes in this chapter.
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However, the real world is rarely that neat and most cases touch on a range of
strategies, so the cases are not that easily pigeonholed. The table of contents by
business practices provides the student of industrial organisation with a guide
to the main strategies discussed in each case.
The chosen organisation of this book reﬂects the main elements of the law
under which the cases were investigated. The law categorises by form of
behaviour (e.g. independent action by one ﬁrm, agreements between ﬁrms,
acquisition of ownership). Economic analysis shows how these legal categories
are sometimes sensible but can also be misleading. For example, similar
economic effects can result from different forms of strategy (e.g. vertical
agreements and vertical mergers), but similar legal forms can also have very
different economic effects (e.g. horizontal mergers and vertical mergers).
Nevertheless, the legal categories will be helpful to lawyers and they also
reﬂect the important context of howmarket power was acquired (as discussed
at the end of section 3).
Thus, the book is arranged in three parts. Part A covers anticompetitive
behaviour by ﬁrms with market power. This includes two different types of
market structure. The ﬁrst is where there is a single dominant ﬁrm which is
under investigation for abusing its dominant position. This provides two
classic examples of potentially exclusionary behaviour: quantity discounts
and incompatibility. Two UK investigations are also included in this part of
the book. In both cases, there are several ﬁrms apparently competing but with
some identiﬁable concern that the competition is not as effective as it might
be. These cases have wider interest because they relate to markets that are
more heavily regulated in other countries and which are in the front line of the
economic life of most consumers: supermarkets and mobile phones.
Part B considers three types of agreement between ﬁrms. The ﬁrst is cartels,
where the offence is clear so the main economic interest is on deterrence,
discovery and damages. The second type of agreement is also horizontal
(i.e. between ﬁrms at the same level of economic activity), but in these cases
there are identiﬁable externalities and beneﬁts from coordination. These cases
examine how the balance can be appraised. The third type of agreement is
vertical between buyer and seller, in particular, manufacturer and wholesaler
or retailer. Such agreements can often be justiﬁed as having beneﬁcial effects,
but they can also be anticompetitive.
Part C contains case studies of merger appraisal and is also arranged in
three subsections. The ﬁrst applies recent econometric techniques designed to
estimate the unilateral effects of horizontal mergers when ﬁrms have differ-
entiated products. The second section considers how to form an expectation
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of whether a merger will enhance coordinated behaviour. The third looks at
cases where the main dimensions of the merger are vertical or conglomerate.
This organisation of cases inevitably leads to some overlap of similar types
of economic analysis (e.g. coordinated effects arise in both market investiga-
tions and mergers; vertical effects arise in agreements and mergers; two-sided
markets arise in agreements and market investigations).48 Each part of the
book is prefaced by a little more legal background and introduces the indivi-
dual case studies.
The selection of cases for inclusion in this book was not systematic. As
editor, I left it largely to the authors to choose cases they knew well and which
interested them for the economic analysis. It turns out that this has provided
remarkable balance across each part of the book. However, it may be that this
selection method creates a bias towards more controversial interventions and
away from cases which have been cleared. In particular, economic expert
witnesses and academic advisers are appointed only for difﬁcult cases where
the competition authority is at loggerheads with the ﬁrms. In the language of
statistics, the book may include more Type 1 errors (too much intervention)
and fewer Type 2 errors (too little intervention) by European competition
authorities. It certainly under-represents clear-cut cases where the authorities
got the decision right. This should be borne in mind when reading a case
which is critical of a decision for being over-interventionist.
Finally, the real value of a good competition policy is in not just the
restoration of competition in a particular case but also the incentive for
good behaviour by other ﬁrms.49 It is far better to encourage ﬁrms to act
competitively in the ﬁrst place. Firms and their advisers must understand the
rules and how they will be applied. Cases must be argued properly and the
economic analysis must be clear. Only then will the appropriate level of
deterrence be attained. Effective deterrence means both that anticompetitive
practices do not develop and that vigorous competition is not deterred by fear
of inappropriate intervention. The payoff to good economic analysis in one
case has a multiplier effect in guiding behaviour in many more markets.50 We
hope that this book will contribute to that end.
48 The reader is reminded to use the table of contents by business practice to ﬁnd these links to similar
concepts.
49 Fans of contact sports will be aware of the importance of the ﬁrst few decisions made by a referee to
establish the mood and vigour of the competition.
50 One recent study suggests that the deterrence effect is an order of magnitude greater than the number of
actual cases; see Deloitte (2007).
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